China: Weak October data, more support likely

October data show the Chinese economy started the fourth quarter on a weak footing
As already indicated by the October PMIs a few weeks ago, Chinese activity data for October published this morning pointed to a softening growth momentum, with data generally coming in weaker than expected. After having picked up in September, annual growth of retail sales dropped back to 0.4% y/y (consensus: 0.8%, September: 1.1%), and to 0.0% m/m (September: 0.3%), with car sales remaining particularly weak. Industrial production growth slowed to 4.8% y/y (consensus: 5.3%, September: 5.5%), and to 0.2% m/m (September: 0.6%). High-tech manufacturing (including semiconductors) still shows high growth rates, but other sectors (including car production) slowed. The slump in overall fixed investment deepened to -8.1 y/y in January-October (consensus: -7.0%, Jan-Sept: -7.2%). This slump is still driven by property investment (-21.6% y/y ytd), but also infrastructure and manufacturing investment remain in negative territory. This shows that recent stimulus measures to prop up infrastructure investment still take time to filter through. Despite these general weak data the surveyed jobless rate in urban areas fell slightly, to 5.1% (consensus/September: 5.2%), but this measure excludes migrant workers who are returning to the country side after losing their job.
2026 target still within reach, but more targeted support likely to safeguard growth in 2027
Despite the weak October data, it is likely that the GDP growth target for 2026 (4.5%-5.0%) will still be met, with growth averaging 4.6% y/y over the first three quarters. That said, Chinese growth this year is leaning very strongly on exports, partly driven by the global AI/tech boom, while domestic supply-demand imbalances do not show signs of easing. We assume the growth contribution from net exports to soften next year, as trade partners like the EU take further measures to contain certain imports (like cars) from China (see Will China Shock 2.0 trigger an EU-China trade war), and the global AI/tech boom loses some steam. This implies that policymakers will have to do more to safeguard overall GDP growth in 2027. Stepping up demand support would kill two birds with one stone, although industrial policy/high-tech upgrading will likely remain a dominant strategic goal.
This summer we already saw a twist in the policy stance, following ‘fiscal underdelivery’ in H1 2026, with Beijing approving loan facilities to support infrastructure investment, including to sectors being part of the Six Networks scheme. We expect more piecemeal monetary easing (in the form of mini policy rate cuts, and lower reserve requirements for banks), alongside ongoing targeted fiscal support for households and firms. Further guidance on government support plans for 2027 will likely be given at the upcoming State Council meeting and the annual Central Economic Work Conference in December. See for more background our 2027 China Outlook, The World alone is not enough.
