Spotlight - Fragmentation to make European Parliament less vigorous

European Parliament elections take place on 6-9 June

This summer Europe goes to the ballot box to vote for the European Parliament. From 6- 9 June more than 400 million eligible voters can choose the members of the European Union’s only directly elected institution for the tenth time since 1979. Originally the European Parliament functioned as an advisory board. However, this has changed. Nowadays, it functions more like a normal national parliament. Its 720 parliamentarians are directly elected by their respective 27 national populations. It has co-legislative power in nearly all policy areas. It has the power to approve the European Union’s budget, and the future European Commission. An important distinction though is that the European Parliament lacks the right to submit laws, a right which is almost entirely reserved for the European Commission. In that sense, the European Parliament is an important institution within the European Union, but not necessarily the most powerful one.

Radical right set to win seats

At the next elections, the Christian Democratic European People's Party (EPP) looks set to remain the largest and most powerful group in Parliament. If the EPP remains the largest party it will likely provide the next president of the European Commission. Therefore chances are that Ursula von der Leyen will be continue to be president. This would contribute to stability in turbulent times.

Traditional mainstream parties such as the Socialist and Democrats (S&D) and the centrist/liberal Renew Europe (RE) are expected to lose seats, as are the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA). Many polls predict significant gains for the radical and extreme right. The most right-wing group, the Identity and Democracy Group (ID) is expected to gain between 10 and 30 seats and could overtake RE as the third largest group in Parliament. The European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) is also projected to gain 5 to 15 seats. Some national parties that are currently non-attached to a European political group (NA), such as the Dutch Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), are negotiating to join ECR, which would enable ECR to potentially take third place instead of the Identity and Democracy Group (ID).

As a result of the expected shift, ‘left’ (S&D, G/EFA and The Left) and ‘centre-left’ (S&D, G/EFA, The Left and RE) coalition minorities will shrink in size. The ‘grand coalition’ of EPP and S&D, which lost its majority in 2019, continues to shrink to 43% of the seats according to the latest IPSOS poll. The majority of the ‘super grand coalition’, that also includes RE, would shrink to 55% of the seats. Reaching voting majorities in Parliament with only 55% of the seats will prove difficult though. The EPP, S&D and RE each consist of national parties, among which opinions and voting behaviour may diverge. Therefore, the ‘super grand coalition’ will increasingly have to seek support from non-attached Members of Parliament to secure majority votes.

Policy-poor period ahead

The expected political shifts mark a change in both policymaking and policy focus. With regards policymaking, European politics tends to be about creating coalitions. Coalitions on policy issues in the European Parliament tend not to be the result of formal agreements. Instead, political groups decide how to vote issue by issue. Research by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that in the past, centre-left (S&D, RE, G/EFA and The Left) coalitions tend to push through legislation on social issues and the environment, centrist parties (EPP, S&D, usually also RE) do so on economic, fiscal, and monetary affairs, and the centre-right (EPP, RE, ECR and sometimes ID) does so rural development, agriculture, and fisheries. However, creating coalitions will become difficult in a more fragmented Parliament. Hence, the current polls could well be the harbinger of a relatively policy poor period.

Regarding the policy focus, we must recognize that Europe is enduring various crises. The economy has gone consecutively through a financial, a euro, a health, and an energy crisis. Covid shocked the health system and tested social cohesion. Wild fires and floodings due to climate change are causing financial damage. The arrival of refugees is stirring social unrest. The post-Cold War peace dividend seems to have ended after the first Trump presidency and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza stoke feelings of insecurity. According to polls conducted in September October last year European citizens are affected by these crises to different degrees, depending on their nationality, age, gender, and education. These differences explain the growing divide and the increase of political fragmentation. Not necessarily along the left-right divide, as in the past, but along the lines of the various crises.

Migration and climate change are in the limelight

The June elections will be shaped by competing worries about climate change, migration, military conflict, and the economy. In contrast to 2019, when concerns about climate change prevailed, the next elections seem to concentrate on migration. After June, a majority in the European Parliament will likely be supportive of restrictive immigration policies. In April the European Parliament voted in favour of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which – despite legal difficulties – includes fast-tracking of asylum claims at external borders and sending people to third countries.

Another shift is expected on the environmental policy front. The green agenda hardly resonates with right wing parties that are, on the contrary, trying to scale down climate policy ambitions. Even the EPP and RE, which used to be proponents of the Green Deal, are becoming less ambitious on the environment. They have already indicated that environmental policies will not be a priority in the next legislative period. The majority of the new Parliament will probably advocate for a more gradual transition, raising the risk that the transition pathway moves away from an ‘orderly Net Zero’ scenario towards a ‘delayed transition’ scenario, triggering a sharper bend in climate policies after 2030. In a delayed transition scenario, climate litigations will increase, calling governments to comply with and implement their own legally binding mitigation commitments to the Net Zero target.

Though the radical parties lack a common program, they are united in their dislike for centralized European policies. Progress on implementing a capital markets union and a common industrial policy strategy may be complicated if national interests become more dominant. Lack of progress on these fronts could hinder competitiveness and productivity growth, which isn’t helpful in the context of growing risks of international trade spats. A more national focus will also affect negotiations on the budget ahead of the upcoming seven-year period starting in 2028. An extension of the budget is required if enlargement plans progress, and if military expenses rise in response to international security threats. Another important budget-related topic is linking cohesion funds to reforms and investment targets, an idea that is gaining support.