The five largest EU economies look off track for their 2030 climate targets

In 2021, the European Union made legally binding its target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. Member States contribute through their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), which set country-specific objectives for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, renewable-energy and energy efficiency. The national plans translate the EU climate framework into country-level objectives across four indicators: GHG emissions; the share of renewable-energy in gross final energy consumption; primary energy consumption, which measures energy use before conversion and distribution losses; and final energy consumption, which measures the energy ultimately used by households, transport, industry and other end-users. Progress therefore requires lower emissions and energy consumption alongside a higher renewable-energy share. In this note, we assess whether recent trends in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain would be sufficient to meet their respective 2030 targets. Belgium is excluded because the available 2030 emissions target applies to sectors covered by the EU Effort Sharing Regulation rather than to economy-wide emissions, making it not directly comparable with the national economy-wide targets used for the other five countries. Because national projections differ in methodology, policy assumptions and coverage, we have developed a common statistical model to assess all five countries consistently and determine whether their recent trajectories are sufficient to meet the four 2030 targets.

A trajectory test, not a policy forecast The model estimates each country’s underlying trajectory using annual observations from 2015 to 2024 and projects this trajectory to 2030. The exceptional effects of the pandemic and energy-price shock are treated separately so that developments in 2020–2022 do not mechanically determine the longer-term trend. The model produces a central projection, uncertainty intervals and an estimated probability of meeting each 2030 target. These results test whether a continuation of the recent trajectory would be sufficient to reach the targets; they do not incorporate the expected effects of future policies or measures that are not yet visible in the historical data. The overall alignment score is the simple average of the target-attainment probabilities for greenhouse-gas emissions, renewable energy, primary-energy consumption and final-energy consumption, with each indicator receiving an equal weight of 25%. It is a descriptive measure of alignment across the four indicators, not the probability that a country will meet all four targets simultaneously. Given the short historical sample, uncertainty remains material. A probability close to zero indicates that meeting the target is very unlikely if the estimated trajectory continues, rather than impossible.

None of the five countries is aligned with all four targets

None of the five economies is aligned with all four 2030 objectives. The Netherlands and Italy perform best on the combined measure, mainly because their projected energy consumption is close to, or already below, some of their 2030 energy-efficiency targets. However, the model indicates that most countries are very unlikely to meet their emissions and renewable-energy targets. The largest and most consistent shortfall is in greenhouse-gas emissions. Under the continuation scenario, projected 2030 emissions exceed the national target in all five countries. Germany has the largest absolute gap, at around 100 MtCO2e, followed by Italy (78 MtCO2e), France (66 MtCO2e) and Spain (47 MtCO2e). The Netherlands has the smallest absolute gap, at around 14 MtCO2e. That said, absolute gaps should be viewed in the context of differences in economic size and current emissions levels.

RES stands for renewable energy share. “Primary proj.” “ stands for Primary energy consumption projections. “Final proj.” stands for final energy consumption projections. Note: National GHG targets do not use fully identical accounting boundaries. France excludes LULUCF; Germany, Italy and Spain include LULUCF and exclude international aviation; the Netherlands uses its economy-wide target. Absolute country gaps should therefore be compared cautiously.

Country differences are driven by energy-consumption targets

France: broad-based shortfalls

Our model projects France to remain above both energy-consumption targets and below the 35% target for the share of renewable energy in 2030. It projects GHG emissions of around 331 MtCO₂e, compared with a target of roughly 265 MtCO2e. This projection is close to France’s official existing-measures projection of 326 MtCO₂e in 2030, which incorporates policies adopted by the end of 2023. The similarity suggests that our model broadly reflects the emissions trajectory expected under existing policies, while confirming that additional measures would be needed to meet the 2030 target. Under the fitted trajectory, the estimated probability of meeting each of the four targets rounds to zero.

Germany: primary energy is close, but emissions and renewables lag

Germany’s position is more nuanced than our trajectory model alone suggests. While our model projects emissions materially above the 2030 threshold, the latest official projection (see here) expects a 62.6% reduction from 1990 levels, only moderately short of the national target of at least 65%. Rapid renewable-power deployment has supported emissions reductions, but progress in transport and building heating remains insufficient. The official assessment includes the expected effects of current policies, while our model tests what would happen if the recent underlying trajectory continued.

Italy: energy efficiency supports a relatively high score

Our model projects Italy’s primary-energy consumption to fall below its national target, giving the country the highest target-alignment probability among the five economies for this indicator. Final-energy consumption is also close to target. However, the outlook for emissions and renewables remains weak, limiting the overall alignment score to around 28%. This mixed picture is consistent with recent national evidence (see here). ECCO’s 2026 monitoring report finds that Italy is progressing too slowly towards many of its energy-transition objectives. Renewable capacity increased by around 7 GW in 2025, below the roughly 10 GW annual pace considered necessary to meet the 2030 targets, while greenhouse-gas emissions rose. Progress in electricity generation has been stronger, but renewables in heating, transport and total final energy consumption remain further behind.

Netherlands: closest overall, but not on emissions or renewables

Our model shows that the Netherlands records the highest average alignment score in our five-country comparison, at around 29%, but this result is driven mainly by energy consumption rather than emissions or renewables. Our model projects 2030 emissions above the national threshold. This finding is consistent with the latest assessment by the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (see here) and with our recent estimates (see here), which incorporate some newly announced policy proposals. Indeed, meeting the legal target of a 55% emissions reduction by 2030 remains extremely unlikely and the projected progress for 2030 has stagnated for three consecutive years. The comparison should nevertheless be interpreted cautiously: our model merely extrapolates the underlying historical trajectory and does not include recent policy changes and policy proposals.

Spain: the largest renewable-energy shortfall

Our model projects Spain’s renewable-energy share at around 26% in 2030, well below the 48% target. Final-energy consumption also remains materially above the target. Primary energy consumption is closer, although the model-implied probability of meeting that target is only around 11%. This broadly aligns with Fedea’s latest assessment (see here), which concludes that achieving the 48% renewable-energy target is no longer feasible under current trends. Renewable energy accounted for an estimated 25.8% of final energy consumption in 2025, with progress concentrated in electricity while renewable penetration in transport and heating and cooling has stalled or declined. In the same report, Fedea also estimates that emissions would need to fall by more than 5% annually through 2030 to meet the national emissions target, a pace historically achieved only in exceptional circumstances.

What the target gaps imply for investment

The gap between our model results and the 2030 targets does not directly translate into an estimate of the additional investment needed to meet those targets. A single investment may simultaneously reduce emissions, support renewable-energy deployment, and lower energy consumption. Moreover, estimates published by national agencies and other public institutions are not directly comparable because they cover different sectors and periods, rely on different assumptions, and differ in whether they include existing investment or only additional investment needs. A robust cross-country comparison would therefore require a sector-level model that links additional physical investment to progress across all four indicators while avoiding double counting. For France, the third edition of the Stratégie pluriannuelle des financements de la transition écologique (SPAFTE), published by the Direction générale du Trésor in October 2026 (see here), assesses the financing of the ecological transition across the French economy and presents the public-policy instruments available to mobilise investment. Low-carbon investment, defined as capital expenditure by households, businesses, and the public sector on assets and technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increased from EUR 77 billion in 2017, equivalent to approximately 3.4% of French GDP, to EUR 102 billion in 2024, equivalent to approximately 3.5% of GDP. To meet the objectives of the third National Low-Carbon Strategy, the third Multiannual Energy Programme, and the national electrification plan, the French Treasury estimates that annual low-carbon investment will need to increase by approximately EUR 82 billion by 2030 relative to its recent level. Based on the EUR 102 billion recorded in 2024, this would imply an annual investment level of roughly EUR 184 billion by 2030. This estimate covers economy-wide investment by households, businesses, and the public sector; it is neither an estimate of additional public expenditure alone nor a cumulative investment requirement for the period up to 2030. The report also estimates that carbon-intensive investment, which amounted to EUR 107 billion in 2024, will need to decline by one-third by 2030. For Italy, the 2024 report by the Osservatorio sulle Imprese e il Sistema delle Rinnovabili (see here) estimates that a total EUR 174.3bn of extra investment is required by 2030, with the estimate focused principally on renewable-energy deployment and related energy-system investment. It is relevant to Italy’s energy-transition objectives, including its national contribution of a 39.4% renewable-energy share in gross final energy consumption by 2030. However, it is not a whole-economy estimate of all investment required to meet Italy’s greenhouse-gas, renewable-energy and energy-efficiency targets. Its scope and time basis also differ from those of the French estimate: the Italian figure is a cumulative estimate focused on part of the energy transition, whereas the French figure concerns the required increase in the annual level of low-carbon investment across the economy by 2030. The two should therefore be treated as indicative national benchmarks rather than directly comparable measures of investment gaps. For Germany, available estimates use a longer time horizon and cannot be placed directly alongside the French and Italian figures. KfW Research (see here) estimates that achieving climate neutrality by 2045 will require approximately EUR 6,000bn, in gross extra climate investment over 2025–2045, equivalent to around EUR 290bn per year. The report estimates that approximately EUR 145bn per year represents net investment relative to conventional fossil technologies. Compared with Germany’s recent net climate-investment level, approximately EUR 65bn of additional investment would need to be mobilised annually. These figures relate to pathways towards climate neutrality in 2045 and do not constitute an estimate of the investment specifically required to meet Germany’s 2030 targets. For Spain, the updated National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (see here) estimates that EUR 308 billion of investment needs to be mobilised over 2021–2030 to achieve the plan’s energy and climate objectives. The plan expects 82% of this amount to come from private investment and 18% from public funding. Approximately 37% is allocated to renewable energy, 28% to energy savings and efficiency, 17% to energy networks and 17% to electrification of the economy; these shares are rounded. The EUR 308 billion represents total investment associated with implementing the plan rather than additional investment above a recent baseline. No consolidated official estimate appears to be available of the amount already invested against this total. Available data cover individual public funding programmes and the investment they mobilise, but do not provide a comprehensive account of public and private expenditure across all sectors covered by the plan. For the Netherlands, the updated Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan describes the investment programmes and public financing instruments supporting the transition but does not provide a single economy-wide estimate directly comparable with the available figures for France or Spain. The plan includes a EUR 35bn Climate and Transition Fund over ten years, in addition to the SDE++ support scheme, to support energy infrastructure, industrial decarbonisation, sustainable mobility and the built environment. This amount represents a public-policy financing instrument rather than the total public and private investment required to meet the Netherlands’ 2030 targets. It should therefore not be used as a central estimate of the country’s aggregate investment requirement. Overall, the available figures provide useful information on the scale and composition of national transition investment, but they do not measure a common concept. France reports an increase in the annual economy-wide investment level, Italy a cumulative estimate focused principally on renewable-energy deployment, Germany a pathway to climate neutrality by 2045, Spain total investment associated with its 2021–2030 national plan, and the Netherlands a specific public financing instrument. The figures are therefore informative national reference points, but they do not support a direct cross-country ranking of investment gaps.

Acceleration is required across all five countries The five economies are not equally distant from their objectives. Italy and the Netherlands are relatively close on energy consumption, while Germany is close to its primary-energy target and may perform better under policy-based projections than a continuation of its historical trajectory suggests. Nevertheless, emissions remain above target under our common statistical framework, and renewable-energy deployment generally needs to accelerate. The overall conclusion is therefore not that the 2030 targets are unattainable, but that recent trends alone are insufficient. Reaching them will require faster implementation of national plans and investment in renewable generation, grids, electrification, buildings and energy efficiency.