Group Economics writes regularly about developments in the macro economy. Here are our latest forecasts on interest rate and currency developments, energy prices and the economic trend in developed and emerging markets.

Consumption and industry are continuing to recover, despite the looming new risks to the outlook. The likely passage of a 2026 budget in France is also a welcome development. We do not expect a lasting solution to France’s fiscal woes, but nor do we expect the country to descend into a crisis. Eurozone inflation remains well behaved, likely keeping the ECB on hold for the foreseeable future. But persistent undershoots in France and Italy are a cause for concern.

The German economy grew by 0.2% q/q in Q4, landing the annual average for 2025 at 0.3%. We expect government spending alongside other factors to drive an increase in growth to 0.9% in 2026. Recent news on delays to government investment and tariffs introduce downside risks to the forecast.

We see the Dutch economy’s growth cooling from 1.7% in 2025 to 1.2% in 2026, and slightly recovering to 1.4% in 2027; private and public consumption is expected to contribute significantly. Inflation is expected to moderate to 2.4% in 2026, down from 3.3% in 2025. The Netherlands is likely to have a minority government, led by D66, VVD, and CDA, with Rob Jetten anticipated as Prime Minister. While policy uncertainty may decrease, compromises with opposition parties will remain essential due to the lack of majority in both parliament and senate.

Post-shutdown data shows a further discrepancy between headline growth and the labour market. Inflation has been mixed, with surprisingly low shutdown period data, followed by a sharp rebound. We see a simple reorientation towards more productive sectors as the most likely explanation.

Real GDP growth slowed to 3-year low of 4.5% y/y in Q4 as expected, annual growth of 5% ‘on target’. Divergence remains: Exports and industrial production solid, offsetting weak investment and retail sales. Risks around fragile US-China truce resurface; targeted support shifts from consumption to investment.

The Netherlands is decarbonising, and the transition is in full swing. However, the pace of the transition to a low-carbon economy is not yet sufficient to achieve the climate targets that have been set. This analysis highlights the shortfall and examines the reasons behind it. Among other things, we see that there are numerous initiatives to decarbonise and that many best practices can now be identified. However, the sectors responsible for the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions – the energy-intensive sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) – still face a major challenge in becoming low-carbon. For many companies in these sectors, decarbonisation solutions are often within reach, but it is the preconditions that often create obstacles. In this analysis, we first examine the trend of a number of sustainability indicators for the Dutch economy and the current state in reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) in various sectors. In doing so, we look at, among other things, the feasibility of the 2030 climate target per sector. We then take a closer look at the portion of emissions covered by the EU ETS and how energy-intensive sectors in industry are performing. Specific industrial climate targets are discussed, including the most obvious decarbonisation options. We end this analysis with a conclusion.

To achieve a real acceleration in decarbonisation, both energy production and consumption must switch to renewable and low-carbon energy sources at an accelerated pace. However, this process is still slow and faces some persistent obstacles, including grid congestion, staff shortages, financing challenges, and the often complex and volatile regulations in many countries. Despite the scaling back and reversal of climate policy in many countries – led by the United States (US) – the European Union (EU) remains committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, as laid down in the European Climate Law. This further increases the differences in decarbonisation paths between countries/regions and pushes climate targets further out of reach. In this analysis, we examine the current state of play in these decarbonisation paths of the most important countries worldwide and of the EU-27 in particular. What are the trends in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of countries and what differences are visible? What goals are the largest GHG-emitting countries pursuing with their climate policies and where does the EU-27 stand in this regard? How does final energy consumption (fossil fuel share) relate to GHG emissions and the trend in energy efficiency? And is the pace of GHG emission reduction (post-Paris Agreement) sufficient to ultimately achieve the EU's climate targets? We end this analysis with a conclusion.

In the transition to a climate-neutral economy, the need for low-carbon technologies will increase further, which will also increase demand for the metals that are essential for manufacturing these technologies. It therefore remains important to continue to monitor trends in this area in order to gain a clear picture of the opportunities and risks. The energy transition is putting increasing pressure on many metal markets. Increasingly, quantities of metals such as copper, nickel, cobalt, and lithium will be needed in the coming years. In some cases, this will lead to shortages, but in most cases, supply will be more than sufficient to meet demand. In this analysis, we highlight a number of dominant critical or strategic metals that are necessary and, above all, indispensable in the energy transition. We distinguish between ‘required’ transition metals (the truly indispensable metals) and the ‘relevant’ transition metals (slightly less indispensable). We show which metals are particularly important for the production of four main clean technologies and calculate the impact of the trend in metal prices on the material costs for producing these clean technologies. Finally, we look at how demand for these metals is expected to develop in the coming years in various IEA scenarios and what influence could the supply-demand balance of these metals have on the price trend for energy transition metals. We end this analysis with a conclusion.

The EU ETS free emission allowances offer companies covered by the emissions trading system protection against competition from abroad. The allocation of free emission allowances limits the costs for ETS companies compared to competitors outside the EU. However, because this system also puts a brake on investments in decarbonization, these free emission allowances will be phased out completely by 2034. From that point on, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will take over to partially minimize the loss of competitiveness. This will bring significant changes, particularly for ETS companies in the industrial sector. In this analysis, we highlight the trend in carbon costs for ETS companies in the Netherlands. To this end, we discuss the structure of the EU ETS in the Netherlands, its trends in ETS emissions, and the balance between free emission allowances and ETS emissions by sector. Finally, we highlight the impact of the phasing out of free emission allowances and the trends in carbon costs for ETS companies towards 2030. We end with a conclusion.

In May of this year, the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) published a quantification of a set of climate scenarios with a time horizon of 5 years. It was the first time that NGFS elaborated climate scenarios with a shorter time horizon. In this note, we select some useful findings from these NGFS scenarios.

Renewables and reforms weaken the gas–carbon–power link, shifting price drivers to long-term factors like renewables, flexibility, and stricter emissions caps.

In this analysis, we examine the trend in emission intensity based on greenhouse gases in the EU-27. Emissions intensity indicates the level of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of activity. Energy and emissions intensity are expected to continue to decline, provided that the EU does not relax its climate policy too much.

The Black Friday period is used by many Dutch people to make purchases, often with an eye on Sinterklaas and Christmas. During this period, consumers spend significantly more than in the past, when the days around Sinterklaas were still the main shopping days. To avoid peak pressure, more retailers are starting earlier in November with offering deals, primarily attracting customers through the internet.

Analysis of 150,000 Dutch households earning a salary provides insight into the development of the cost of living pressures. We examine the extent to which a household’s net income is consumed by fixed expenses and groceries. Grocery prices have increased significantly; households are spending more on them compared to seven years ago. Nevertheless, cost of living is improving because incomes have risen more sharply than fixed expenses and grocery expenses. The percentage of households that spend a large portion of their income on fixed expenses and groceries has decreased.

An analysis of the income of six cohorts of first-year students shows that their financial position has improved. Both the reintroduction of the basic study grant and rising hourly wages have contributed to this. First-year students have become less dependent on student loans. They borrowed less, resulting in a smaller student debt. Last year, first-year students experienced the financial freedom to work fewer hours.

Analysis of 340,000 Dutch households provides insight into the development of the cost of living for the first time. We examine the extent to which a household's net income is consumed by fixed expenses, making basic expenditures and coping with setbacks difficult.

We study the effects of lower housing costs on expenditures by examining the income-dependent rent reduction of 2023. The income-dependent rent reduction is partly offset by a lower housing allowance, and the remaining portion is fully consumed. The net rent reduction thus directly contributes to higher household consumption and is not used to build financial buffers. Our analysis also highlights significant challenges in implementing targeted income-dependent rent policies.

Although extreme gas price increases occurred two years ago, the energy crisis of 2021-2023 is still fresh in our minds. How have household energy costs evolved during and after the energy crisis? It is well-known that not everyone felt the impact of higher energy prices at the same time, but where do we stand now, two years later?

Jaap Teerhuis is a Senior Fixed Income Strategist at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank

Larissa Fritz is a Senior Fixed Income Strategist, with focus on ESG at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank.

Jan-Paul van de Kerke is Senior Economist covering the Netherlands and the eurozone at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank.

In this publication, we answer the question of what the path of the Dutch economy and its sectors towards the ultimate 2050 climate-neutral goal might look like. In particular, we look here at the impact that low-carbon technologies can have on reducing greenhouse gases for 21 sectors in our so-called Sector Technology Pathways. What sectors are the heavyweights in the transition, where is reducing greenhouse gases most challenging and what are bottlenecks we need to overcome in the transition?

Climate change creates greater risks that are more frequent and cause more damage to Dutch homes. This study addresses the question of which districts can be deemed ‘climate-vulnerable districts’, i.e. those in which the risks of climate change, but also the costs of energy efficiency measures, may be too much for homeowners or properties to bear.

The energy transition is an economy wide process where a development in one part affects, directly or indirectly, other parts. Bottlenecks or costs challenges could harm an effective energy transition. The effect of today’s bottlenecks on the transition, such as the limited grid capacity, is magnified because of the mismatch in the timeframe for deploying grid extensions versus what is needed for electrification or renewable deployments.

The Rhine, the busiest river in Europe, is of great economic importance. Due to drought, both in 2018 and 2022, there have been episodes where the water level in the Rhine has dropped to critical levels, severely limiting inland shipping. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, in November 2018, low water levels led to a drop in industrial production by 1.5 percent, causing a decline of German GDP by 0.4 percent. 1)

Biodiversity stands for biological diversity. The loss of biodiversity translates into the loss of services provided by ecosystems to the real economy. There are two types of risks associated with biodiversity: physical and transitions risks. Physical risks stem from the loss of biodiversity (for instance, disappearance of animal pollinators, like bees), and transition risks stem from regulations/policies introduced by regulators to mitigate biodiversity loss (such as the introduction of a tax on fertilizers or the implementation of Natura 2000). Physical risks are captured by how much a sector depends on biodiversity (e.g. agriculture depends a lot on animal pollinators, like bees). And transition risks are captured by how much a sector impacts biodiversity (i.e. the more damage a firm causes, the more likely it is to be hit by policies acting against it). The ENCORE database provides qualitative assessments for each sector and sub-sector on their exposure to biodiversity risks and we use these to calculate quantitative biodiversity sector exposure scores. As per existing regulation, banks are required to report their loan book exposure per sector, according to the NACE categorisation. Hence, by combining banks’ loan book exposure per sector and sector scores on biodiversity dependence and impact, we were able to calculate individual banks’ exposure to biodiversity loss risks. Furthermore, we used Natural Language Processing to assess a bank’s awareness of its balance sheet exposure to biodiversity risks.